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Abstract
Deception remains a hotly debated topic in evolutionary and behavioural research. Our understanding of what impedes or
facilitates the use and detection of deceptive signals in humans is still largely limited to studies of verbal deception under
laboratory conditions. Recent theoretical models of non-human behaviour have suggested that the potential outcome for
deceivers and the ability of receivers to discriminate signals can effectively maintain their honesty. In this paper, we
empirically test these predictions in a real-world case of human deception, simulation in soccer. In support of theoretical
predictions in signalling theory, we show that cost-free deceit by soccer players decreases as the potential outcome for the
signaller becomes more costly. We further show that the ability of receivers (referees) to detect deceptive signals may limit
the prevalence of deception by soccer players. Our study provides empirical support to recent theoretical models in
signalling theory, and identifies conditions that may facilitate human deception and hinder its detection.
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Introduction
Deception is ubiquitous throughout human society and the
animal kingdom, and remains a central theme in behavioural and
evolutionary biology [1,2,3,4,5]. Deception occurs when an
individual benefits from signalling false information to a receiver
[6]. In humans, deceptive signals can be intentional and used to
convey false information to manipulate a receiver. Since scientific
observers share the same sensory system as their human subjects,
identifying deception is easier than in nonhuman systems [7,8].
However, our understanding of human deception is largely
restricted to verbal signals and laboratory conditions due to
ethical limitations in human research [9]. Identifying incentives for
using deceit and improving the detection of deception in humans
has received growing interest because of the clinical and legal
applications [10,11,12,13].
The cost of signals is the most widely accepted mechanism
thought to maintain honesty in animal communication
[14,15,16,17]. Recent theoretical models have demonstrated that
the potential cost of deception, not just signal production costs, can
maintain honesty under conflict of interest [15,18,19,20,21,22]. As
long as the potential cost of deception is greater than the potential
benefit, signallers will refrain from using deceptive signals [15].
There are several mechanisms whereby honesty could be
maintained using the potential cost of deception, which largely
rely on how receivers discriminate and respond to signals. Firstly,
punishment of deceivers can deter the use of deception [5,23].
Secondly, negative frequency-dependant selection strengthens
correct discrimination of signals by receivers, as deceivers only
benefit when rare in a population [24,25]. Finally, close spatial
proximity to signallers can improve a receiver’s ability to detect
and discriminate among signals [20,21,22,26]. Under these
mechanisms, how receivers respond to signals can greatly alter
the potential outcome for deceivers and therefore the prevalence
of deception. Despite the potential for identifying conditions that
impede or facilitate the use and detection of human deception,
animal signalling theory has not been applied to humans in real-
world scenarios.
Professional sport is a real-world scenario that provides an
opportunity to investigate human deception using animal
signalling theory. In sport, players use deception to manipulate
the behaviour of the opposition or referee to gain a competitive
advantage [11,27,28]. In soccer, simulation behaviour (‘taking a
dive’) is notorious and has substantial impacts on the quality of a
match, its perceived fairness, and the game’s worldwide market-
ability. A ‘dive’ (deceptive signal) is synonymous with animal
mimicry, and occurs when a player (signaller) intentionally mimics
the behaviour of an illegal tackle-induced fall (reliable cue) and the
referee (receiver) responds as if it were a tackle-induced fall by
rewarding the player with a free kick (signaller benefit). A tackle-
induced fall, herein referred to as a tackle, is treated as a reliable
cue rather than an honest signal, as signalling players can not
choose to produce a tackle, it is forced upon them [5]. Dives are
considered cost-free deceptive signals, as the cost and benefit of
deception are solely dependent on how referees respond to the
signal and not incurred from the production of the signal itself.
Here, we use behavioural deceit in soccer players, to empirically
test predictions drawn from animal signalling theory [15,18,
19,20,21,22]. Specifically, we test whether the potential outcome
for deceptive signallers and receiver ability to discriminate among
signals, reduces the use of deception when interests conflict. In
support of animal signalling theory [15,18,19,
20,21,22], we show that cost-free deceit by soccer players
decreases as the potential outcome for the signaller is more costly
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e26017or, less beneficial. Further, we find the ability of receivers to detect
deception varies with spatial proximity and culture.
Methods
This study was approved by the Human Experimentation
Ethics Review Committee (HEERC) at the University of Queens-
land as the work conducted used pure observation of human
behaviour that occurred in an open forum to the general public
whereby observed subjects were not identified in the dataset. The
HEERC waived the need for consent from observed subjects.
Ten televised matches from six high-profile professional soccer
leagues were assessed using real-time, replay, slow-motion and
multi-angle high definition footage (n=60). A single observer
categorised every fall as a: ‘dive’ (player falls intentionally
mimicking the effects of a tackle whereby minimal or no contact
was made by an opponent), ‘tackle’ (player falls because of the
contact made by opponent) or ‘NA’ (player falls of their own
accord, and no intentional mimicking of a tackle is used; i.e. loses
balance, trips over, roles an ankle etc.). Non-referee observers
using television replays have been previously shown to be capable
of reliably distinguishing between dives and non-dives, as well as
reliably assessing the intentions of falling players [28]. We
quantified the repeatability of our fall categorisation by re-
examining ten falls selected at random from every match. Overall
repeatability of categorising falls was 99.86 0.002%, with the
repeatability for ‘dive’, ‘tackle’ and ‘NA’ fall categories being 100,
100 and 90%, respectively. ‘NA’ falls were only recorded in the
first nine analysed matches to gain high categorisation repeatabil-
ity, and then ignored subsequently due to irrelevance to the
investigated outcomes. In all statistical analyses only dive and
tackle falls were used.
For every categorised fall the following variables were noted:
pitch zone, signaller team score, match time, league and referee
response. Of the 2803 falls observed across sixty soccer matches,
169 (6%) were dives (deceptive signals) and 2633 (94%) were
tackles (reliable cues). The mean frequency of dives and tackles per
match were 3.060.2 and 44.061.1, respectively (n=60). On
average, referees rewarded 1.060.1 (33%) dives and 20.060.1
(45%) tackles per match. The occurrence of dives and tackles were
not correlated (rho=0.138, n=60, P=0.2917). Therefore, the
choice by soccer players to use dives was not associated with the
occurrence of tackles.
The soccer pitch was divided into six zones ordered by
increasing proximity to the attacking goal (Fig. 1a, insert): Db
(defensive box), Da (defensive area), Dm (defensive middle), Am
(attacking middle), Aa (attacking area) and Ab (attacking box). Any
fall that occurred on the penalty-box line was treated as the second
furthest zone from the respective goal (i.e. attacking area not the
attacking box). The spatial area of each zone was calculated using
the maximum pitch dimensions outlined in the 2009/2010 FIFA
‘laws of the game’. Based on the assumption that referees spend
most of the match time in the centre of the pitch, receiver
proximity to each signal was determined by grouping the pitch
zone data in the following factor levels: close (Dm & Am), near (Da
& Aa) and far (Db & Ab).
The data set consisted of count, nominal and ordinal data.
Whilst means and standard errors are presented in figures and
descriptive statistics, nonparametric methods were used for all
analyses. All correlational relationships between data were
Figure 1. Deception across pitch zones and team scores. Dive
use by soccer players is expressed as (A) the mean proportion of total
falls per match that were dives; (B) the mean frequency of dives per
match across pitch zones (corrected for spatial area) ordered by
increasing distance from the defensive goal (see insert); and, (C) the
mean frequency of dives per match that were signalled when the player
was winning, losing or drawing. Standard error bars are presented
(n=60). Asterisks denote significant differences based on post-hoc
Tukey-Kramer HSD (P,0.05; **P,0.01; ***P,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026017.g001
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Analyses for both ‘potential outcomes for deceivers’ and ‘receiver
proximity to signal’ used generalised linear mixed effect models
(lmer) to determine significant effects of fixed factors on response
variables; signal or reward counts (family= Poisson) and dive or
reward proportions (family= Binomial), whereby ‘match’ was
treated as a nested random factor. Whereas ‘negative frequency-
dependent selection’ was analysed using generalised linear models
(glm). The fixed factors (levels in brackets) tested were: pitch zone
(Db, Da, Dm, Am, Aa and Ab), signaller team score (winning,





frequency (count data), league (A, B, C, D, E and F) and receiver
proximity to signal (close, near, far). When determining the effects
of pitch zone or proximity on dive use or reward frequency, dive
and reward frequency were corrected for spatial area of zone
(count/km
2 area). Match time had no significant effect on dive use.
Following significant effects in models, post-hoc pairwise compar-
isons using Tukey-Kramer HSD were calculated to determine
significant differences between levels on the response variables. To
determine significant differences between paired data on the
rewarded proportion of dives versus tackles, for league and score,
Paired-Wilcoxen signed rank tests were used with one-tailed tests
reported for P values.
Results
We predicted deception would be less common when the
potential outcome for the deceiver is more costly relative to the
potential benefit [15]. Thus, we expected dive frequency would
decrease closer to the defensive goal, as goal-conceding opportu-
nity (potential cost of deception) increases but goal-scoring
opportunity (potential benefit of deception) decreases. In support
of our prediction, dive frequency significantly decreased towards
the defensive goal (dive frequency, rho=0.282, P,0.001; relative
to tackles, rho=0.238, P,0.001). Further, relative to tackles, dives
were significantly more common in the two closest zones to the
attacking goal, than the zone closest to the defensive box (Fig. 1a,
Db vs. Ab, Aa; P=0.012; P=0.041). Also, players dived twice as
frequently when in the zone closest to the attacking goal than
when in any defensive zone (Fig. 1b, Ab vs. Db, Da, Dm,
P,0.001; P,0.001; P=0.007). Similarly, in the second closest
zone to the attacking goal, players dived more frequently than in
any defensive zone (Fig. 1b, Aa vs. Db, Da, P=0.006; P=0.006).
Dive frequency also increased towards the attacking goal despite
referees rewarding proportionally fewer dives in those zones
(rho=0.228, P,0.011). Thus, deception in soccer players
decreases towards the defensive goal where the potential outcome
for the deceiver is more costly. Further, soccer players increase the
use of deception towards the attacking goal where the potential
outcome is most beneficial despite less chance of receiving the
reward.
We investigated whether dive use by players would be affected
by the signalling player’s current score during a game. For
instance, the potential benefit a player can gain from a dive is
greatest when the score is even (goal-scoring opportunity to win
match), less when losing (a goal-scoring opportunity to draw
match) and lowest when winning (a goal-scoring opportunity to
maintain win). As expected, significantly fewer dives occurred
when players were winning or losing than when drawing (Fig. 1c,
Drawing versus winning, losing, P=0.007; P=0.014). Dive
frequency significantly decreased in the order of drawing, losing
and winning (rho=0.202, n=60, P=0.006). Soccer players
therefore used deception when the potential outcome for the
deceiver was most beneficial.
Receivers are expected to play an important role in limiting
deception and thereby maintain honesty [15,22]. Punishment of
deceptive signallers by receivers can increase the potential cost of
deception and thereby deter its use [5,23]. We predicted that
punishment administered by referees would be associated with a
decrease in dives. However, of the 169 observed dives, none were
punished by the referee. Of the 2633 tackles, 7 (0.3%) received a
free-kick against the signalling player and 2 were punished with a
yellow card. As such, no relationship between the punishment of
deceivers and a decrease in the prevalence of deception was
detected.
Negative frequency-dependent selection is common in cases of
animal mimicry [24,25] whereby, deception is less successful when
more frequent. We therefore predicted that dives by soccer players
would be rewarded with a free-kick less often when more
prevalent. Unexpectedly, dives were rewarded more often when
they were more frequently used (by frequency, rho=0.704,
P,0.001; proportionally, rho=0.372, P=0.004). Also, the
proportion of dives that were rewarded significantly varied across
leagues (F5,54=5.367, P,0.001). The frequency of dives was
positively associated with the proportion of dives rewarded by
referees across leagues (Fig. 2a, rho=1, n=6,P=0.003). League
‘F’ had significantly more dives rewarded than leagues A, B and C
(Fig. 2a, F versus A, B, C, P=0.006; P=0.013; P=0.045). We also
determined whether different leagues rewarded proportionally
fewer dives than tackles. Referees in leagues A, B, C and D
rewarded significantly fewer dives than tackles (Fig. 2b, A, B, C, D,
P=0.002; P=0.010; P=0.044; P=0.020). In contrast to our
prediction, deception by soccer players was more successful when
more common.
Spatial proximity of receivers to a signal is expected to improve
the detection of signals [26]. Given that referees spend the
majority of time in the centre of the pitch, we predicted that all fall
signals by soccer players would be rewarded more often when they
occurred closer to the referee. Referees rewarded more falls when
closer to the signal (by frequency, rho=20.669, P,0.001;
proportionately, rho=20.675, P,0.001). Falls that occurred
close to the referee were three times more likely to be rewarded
with a free-kick than those that occurred furthest away (i.e. goal
boxes) (Fig. 3a, far vs. close, near, P,0.001; P,0.001; near vs.
close, P,0.014). Tackles were also rewarded less often when the
referee was further away from the signalling player (by frequency,
rho=20.696, P,0.001; proportionally, rho=20.684, P,0.001).
Proportionally, tackles that occurred furthest from the referee were
rewarded the least, whereas those that were closer were rewarded
most often (Fig. 3b, far tackles vs. close, near, P,0.001; P,0.001;
near tackles vs. close, P=0.006). Similarly, dives were rewarded
less frequently when further from the referee (rho=20.194,
P,0.009). Referees were therefore less likely to respond to any fall
when further away from the signaller. However, despite falls being
rewarded more often when closer to the referee, deception did not
significantly increase with closer proximity (rho=20.071,
P=0.342).
Closer proximity to a signal is also expected to improve the
ability of receivers to discriminate between deceptive and reliable
signals [20,21,22]. We therefore predicted that the proportion of
dives rewarded would be less that the proportion of tackles
rewarded with a free-kick when in close proximity to the referee
(i.e. better receiver discrimination ability). As predicted, when
players were closest to the referee, a significantly lower proportion
of dives were rewarded than tackles (Fig. 3b, close dives vs. tackles,
P,0.005) but not when further away. Thus, closer proximity to
signals was associated with improved signal detection [26] and
discrimination ability by referees [20,21,22].
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Our data suggests that humans are less likely to use deception
when the potential cost for the deceiver is high relative to the
potential benefit. Also, our results highlight that the ability to
detect deception in humans may be associated with spatial
proximity to the deceiver and cultural influences. Furthermore,
cost-free deceit in soccer players provides empirical support to
theories of animal signalling [15,18,19,20,21,22].
The potential cost of deception may deter deceit by soccer
players, whereas, the potential benefit of deception may act as an
incentive. We found soccer players chose to deceive less frequently
in defensive zones where the potential costly outcome was high
relative to the potential benefit, and the inverse pattern also holds.
However, these results do not allow us to distinguish whether it is
the potential benefit or, the potential cost, that plays a stronger
role in a player’s decision to deceive. When considering the
current score of the signalling player’s team, deception was more
common when the potential benefit was greatest (a draw score).
However, this could be due in part to teams spending greater
match time with a draw score. Overall, our results do suggest that
humans are more likely to deceive when the potential outcome is
highly beneficial, thereby outweighing the potential cost. Or
conversely, when the potential outcome is very costly relative to
the potential benefit, it may deter the use of deception.
Interestingly, deceivers did not appear to take into account the
likelihood of receiving a benefit, as dive frequency increased
towards the attacking goal despite the referees rewarding
proportionally fewer dives in those pitch zones. This pattern
suggests that the potential benefit to deceivers may be a stronger
incentive to deceive than the potential cost as a deterrent.
Furthermore, the absence of punishment of deceivers by referees
may also encourage the use of deception by soccer players.
The ability of referees to detect deception increased with closer
proximity to the deceiver. Dives were rewarded less often relative
to tackles when closest to the referee thereby supporting the
prediction that receiver discrimination improves with closer
proximity to the signaller [20,21,22]. Overall, more falls were
rewarded when closer to the referee supporting the idea that signal
detection improves with closer proximity to the signaller
[21,22,26]. Another interpretation is that referees were reluctant
to reward signals nearest to the goal, where the outcome for the
Figure 2. Detection of deception across leagues. (A) The mean
proportion of total dives that were rewarded by the referee with a free-
kick and the mean dive frequency of 10 matches in each league (n=6).
(B) Separated in to dives or tackles, the mean proportion that were
rewarded by the referee across matches (n=10) within each league.
Leagues (A – F) are not identified due to ethical considerations.
Standard error bars are presented. Black solid line indicates R
2 however
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, rho, was used to calculate
significance. Asterisks denote significant differences based on Paired-
Wilcoxen signed rank tests (P,0.05; **P,0.01; ***P,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026017.g002
Figure 3. Detection of deception and referee proximity to
signals. Receiver proximity is expressed as the referee being close,
near or far to the fall signal. (A) The mean proportion of total falls that
were rewarded by the referee per match across receiver proximity
categories. (B) The mean proportions of total dives and tackles that
were rewarded by the referee per match across receiver proximity
categories. Standard error bars are presented (n=60). Asterisks denote
significant differences based on post-hoc Tukey-Kramer HSD (P,0.05;
**P,0.01; ***P,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026017.g003
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that linesmen occasionally contribute to the referee’s decision-
making and, the assumption that referees remain centrally on the
pitch may not always hold true. Despite these caveats, our results
do suggest that closer proximity to a deceiver can improve the
detection of deception in soccer players.
Differences in the relative proportion of rewarded dives to
tackles among leagues suggest there may be cultural differences in
the ability of referees to discriminate deception or the ability of
players to mimic tackles [9]. Further, the variation observed in
discrimination ability by professional referees across leagues could
be attributed to real-world cultural pressures because, under lab
conditions non-referee observers can reliably distinguish between
dives and tackle-induced falls [28]. Distinguishing among these
alternative hypotheses opens up exciting avenues for further
empirical analyses.
Professional soccer is a modern real-world human scenario,
whereby soccer players intentionally deceive the referee by
behaviourally mimicking a tackle-induced fall. Unlike tackles,
dives are intentionally signalled and players can choose when to
produce them [28]. The behavioural mimicry in this system
therefore implies there is only the choice to deceive because
opponents control tackle-induced falls (i.e. a reliable cue).
Therefore, dive frequency reflects only changes in the decision
to use deceptive signals. Note that when a referee rewards a dive, it
is a clear case of undetected deception whereas a referee not
rewarding a tackle-induced fall with a free-kick does not imply an
undetected reliable cue because tackles can be either legal or
illegal. As such, the strength of this study’s empirical support for
signalling theory is based on deceptive signalling and not the
reliability of cues.
Our findings in a real-world human system provides empirical
support of current signalling theory whereby, the potential cost for
deceivers can maintain honesty under conflict of interest
[15,18,19,20,21,22]. In support of signalling theory [15,18], the
prevalence of cost-free deception in soccer players decreased as the
potential outcome for deceivers was more costly relative to the
potential benefit. In soccer, receiver proximity to signallers was
associated with increased ability of receivers to discriminate and
detect signals [21,22,26]. Deceptive signals by soccer players are
cost-free and, the maintenance of honesty under conflict of interest
was associated with how receivers respond and, the potential
outcomes for deceivers. Furthermore, our results emphasise that
receivers can play an important role in the maintenance of honesty
under conflict of interest. Therefore our study of deception in
humans supports theoretical models of animal signalling
[15,18,20,21,22,23,26]. Furthermore, we hope this study has
demonstrated the value of applying nonhuman research to human
systems, to better understand human behaviour [29].
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